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 In each case it seems we can perceive that a mathematical 
truth is so, and also at the same time that it must be so. It is 
as though at the same time we see the truth and the reason 
for it.   
 There has been a recent upsurge of interest in the role of 
diagrams in mathematics (e.g. Brown 1999, Giaquinto 
2007, Mumma 2010: many inspired by Manders 2008) and 
logic (Shin 2002), a growing awareness that diagrams can 
serve as more than just a post hoc illustration of necessary 
reasoning in some more “serious” nondiagrammatic form.  
 We believe this movement also holds profound implications 
for general epistemology currently blocked by ideas 
descending from Hume.  
1. Key Examples 
2. The Humean  Claim 
3. Humean Theory of Perception  
Epistemology: Passive, Atomistic 
4. Modal Combinatorialism / Hume‟s Fork  
5. Hume in the Light of Contemporary 
Cognitive Psychology 
6. Back to our Examples 
7. Conclusion 
 What ideas? 
 The claim that we perceive necessity is somehow 
antinaturalistic.: 
 „“…we do not understand our own must-detecting faculty.” 
Not only are we aware of no bodily mechanism attuned to 
modal aspects, it is unclear how such a mechanism could work 
even in principle….‟ (Wright citing Blackburn) 
 Relatedly, Benacerraf has made a career out of invoking 
scepticism about mathematical knowledge claiming that 
the usual “semantics for mathematics” does not “fit an 
acceptable epistemology”, since it:  
 “…will depict truth conditions in terms of… objects whose 
nature, as normally conceived, places them beyond the reach 
of the better understood means of human cognition (e.g. sense 
perception and the like)” (Benacerraf, 1973, p. 667). 
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 Why are these view held?  
 Arguably, the downstream legacy of Hume‟s empiricism 
 This is encapsulated in the widely influential, supposedly 
common-sense Humean maxim:  
 “There are no necessary connections between distinct 
existences”.  
 But what does this mean exactly? And is it true? 
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Hume writes: 
 “No connexions between distinct existences are ever 
discoverable among human understanding.” (Treatise, 
Appendix) 
 
 „„There is no object, which implies the existence of any other if 
we consider these objects in themselves.‟‟ (Treatise, 1, III, vi) 
 
 “Any thing may produce any thing. Creation, annihilation, 
motion, reason, volition; all these may arise from one 
another, or from any other object we can imagine…no objects 
are contrary to each other, but existence and non-existence.” 
(Treatise, 1, III, xv)   
    *Quite remarkable!  
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 But what exactly is meant by „existences‟, or „objects‟?  
 Consider Hume‟s most famous application of his principle, 
to causality (famous passage about billiard balls):  
 “I consider, in what objects necessity is commonly suppos‟d to 
lie; and finding that it is always ascrib‟d to causes and effects, 
I turn my eye to two objects suppos‟d to be plac‟d in that 
relation. . . . I immediately perceive, that they are contiguous 
in time and place, and that the object we call cause precedes 
the other we call effect. In no one instance can I go any 
farther....” (Treatise, 1, III, xiv) 
 Here Hume speaks as if the „objects‟ are the balls 
themselves, but he is actually talking about their motions. 
 Properties and events must therefore count as „objects‟ or 
„existences‟ for Hume.  
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 But then, what about the properties „black‟ and „white‟? The 
events of 2 and 3 hours passing? Or, to return to 
mathematics, the „objects‟ ∅ and {∅}? 
 What Hume means by „distinct‟ cannot be fully understood 
apart from his theory of perception and the epistemology 
he twines around it.  
 Hume‟s theory of perception has two broad features we 
wish to argue against: 
 It is passive 
 It is atomistic 
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Passive: 
i) Ideas are simple copies of impressions  
ii) Impressions of reflexion consist solely in combinations of 
impressions of sensation:     
  Sensory impressions are the building blocks of all thought. 
iii) All mental activity is „perception-like‟:  
 Reflexion too is a form of perception  of ideas that are 
„weaker‟ and  „less vivid‟:  
 “To hate, to love, to think, to feel, to see; all this is nothing but 
to perceive” (Treatise 1, II, vi) 
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iv) Denial of abstract ideas.  
 Hume defines abstract ideas as ideas that are general in that at 
least some of their  determinable properties lack determination. 
E.g. a „general triangle‟: neither isosceles or scalene.  
 He claims (following Berkeley) there are no general ideas, only 
particular ideas used in a general way (e.g. a proof about 
triangles to be valid might need to draw on the particular ideas of 
isosceles and scalene and equilateral triangles...)  
 Allowing abstract ideas would render the mind active since it 
would need to choose which determinables to abstract from. 
 Hume sees the denial of abstract ideas as a properly naturalistic 
position to take against scholastic obscurantism. 
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Atomistic: 
i)  Separate Imaginability Criterion of Distinctness 
 When we distinguish shape from colour in an object such as a 
white globe, it is not that we examine the white globe and use 
reason to distinguish its whiteness and roundess as abstract 
ideas (medieval period: „prescinding‟, „prescission‟).  
 Rather, what we do is imagine black globes and white cubes.  
 Without such a literal, quasi-perceptual forcing apart of ideas we 
cannot distinguish them, though we might think we can, a cause 
of much confusion and wasted time in philosophy:...“that 
distinction of reason, which is so much talked of, and is 
so little understood, in the schools.” (Treatise, 1, I, vii) 
 Thus Hume denies that we can prescind without separating: 
“...all ideas, which are different, are separable...” 
(Treatise, 1, I, vii). This is crucial. 
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 Recall Hume‟s remark:  
 “...no objects are contrary to each other, but existence and 
non-existence”   
 This implies that objects as he understands them are all 
compossible – in other words, they have no natures which 
might produce impossibilities in combining them. Thus 
such necessities as do exist in the world may only consist in 
constant conjunction between discrete „objects‟.   
 Hence: Modal Combinatorialism.  
 ‘top-down’ combinatorialism: any whole can be decomposed into 
some given set of atomic parts. (*HUME DOESN‟T MEAN THIS)  
 ‘bottom-up’ combinatorialism: given some set of atomic parts, any 
permutation of them is possible. (*HE MEANS THIS) 
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 Hume’s Fork (Flew): strict division of knowledge into 
relations between ideas, determined a priori, and matters 
of fact, learned through experience.  
 This actually follows from Modal Combinatorialism, in a 
weird way.  
 If matters of fact are atomic and all compossible, and thus 
cannot generate any necessities from their own natures, 
then this means that Hume must confine knowledge of 
necessary connexion to „relations between ideas‟ (often 
thought of as analytic / determinable merely by inspecting 
language). 
 Simple physical example: if the natures of mass and motion don‟t rule 
out any combination of these „objects‟, then a law of nature (e.g. F = ma) 
can be nothing more than an extremely widespread regularity. Thus 
causal necessity is not „real necessity‟.  
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 The Fork has been problematic for mathematics, where the 
general agreement that mathematics does deal with 
relations of ideas, discoverable a priori forces the 
conclusion that it‟s entirely disconnected from real-world 
observation.  
 Our mathematical examples can serve as particularly clear 
counterexamples to the Fork‟s overwhelming influence on 
contemporary analytic epistemology if rendered immune to 
Humean challenges.  
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 In using recent scientific results to bolster philosophical 
argument one risks falling hostage to empirical fortune.  
 However there is a wealth of contemporary empirical 
research undermining both the passivity and atomism of 
Hume's view of perception.  
i) Passivity: 
 The brain‟s functioning is far from Hume‟s simple copying 
of impressions into ideas.  
 Andy Clark: “Brains…are bundles of cells that support 
perception and action by constantly attempting to match 
incoming sensory inputs with top-down expectations or 
predictions” (Clark, 2012) 
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ii) Atomism: 
 Not only is the mind organised sufficiently holistically to support 
„top-down predictions‟, it appears that it operates this way at a 
number of distinct functional levels which are richly inter-
related, producing:  
 “a cascade of cortical processing events in which higher-level 
systems attempt to predict the inputs to lower level ones on the 
basis of their own emerging models of the causal structure of the 
world” (Clark, 2012) 
 A particularly nice anti-atomistic example: the perception of 
symmetry. This is a high-level structural property.  
 In fact the necessary truth perceivable in fig 1 draws directly on 
symmetry-perception in recognising the sameness of the rows 
and columns, while the symmetry of the square and of the 
diamond plays a key role in recognising the necessary geometric 
truth in fig 2.  
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 E.g. Vertical bilateral symmetry is perceived much faster 
than other symmetries (e.g. about other axes, repetitions of 
shapes in friezes). It can be perceived when the stimulus 
array is presented for 160 milliseconds - less time than the 
brain takes to attend to anything.  
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Fig 4: vertical bilateral symmetry 
has an immediate and salient “look” 
compared to symmetry about an 
oblique axis. 
 
 Vertical Bilateral Symmetry is a global property of an array. 
Yet perception of it is as immediate as any perception can 
be – and unquestionably pre-reflective. 
 The deeply automatic and pre-reflective nature of 
symmetry perception is confirmed by its appearance in 
animals, including very simple ones. E.g. bees - it is 
possible to train bees to prefer either symmetrical or 
asymmetrical patterns, but symmetry comes more naturally 
to them (Giurfa et al, 1996).  
 Bees are not reflective animals, and it is hard to believe they 
deal in “relations of ideas”, in Hume‟s sense. They just see. 
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Back to Fig. 1:  
  
  
  
 
               
   
  
  
  
   
  
Does this constitute a necessary connection between distinct 
existences? Well, what are the „objects‟ here? The Humean has 
some choices, all unsatisfactory: 
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i) Physical Mark View: The relevant objects are: 
 5 of these:   
 6 of these:  
 which go together to make 5 oval + star combos, such as: 
 
 This appears to be a natural choice in terms of the 
organisation of our visual field when regarding the page.  
Recall the Humean Separate Imaginability Criterion of 
Distinctness: we can imagine each of these shapes 
existing on its own on the page.  
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• But then it is false that there are 
no necessary connections between 
these objects as positioned in fig 1.  
• For instance, one cannot change 
the number of stars in the vertical 
ovals without changing the 
number of stars in the horizontal 
ovals.  
• Interpreted thus, then, Hume‟s 
maxim is simply incorrect.  
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ii) Abstract Object View: On the other hand, we might claim 
that fig.1 doesn„t display a truth about physical marks but 
about something more purely mathematical or abstract – 
for instance the relevant objects/existences are three ‘2s’ 
and two ‘3s’.  
 These objects are arguably not distinct. E.g. 2 is made up 
of „two ones‟ and 3 is made up of „three ones‟, so 2 is a 
proper part of 3.  
 At this point, then, Hume might defend his maxim by 
stating that fig 1 solely expresses relations between ideas, 
and he never meant to claim that ideas were distinct 
existences (c.f. „The Fork‟).  
1. Key Examples 
2. The Humean  Claim 
3. Humean Theory of Perception  
Epistemology: Passive, Atomistic 
4. Modal Combinatorialism/Hume‟s Fork  
5. Hume in the Light of Contemporary 
Cognitive Psychology 
6. Back to our Examples 
7. Conclusion 
 But there is something unsatisfying here. It seems 
puzzling to claim that we can gain mathematical 
knowledge by examining fig 1, and yet that mathematical 
objects are entirely separate from perceived experience.  
 Furthermore, now Hume‟s claim that there are no 
necessary connections between distinct existences seems 
to beg the question, to arbitrarily rule out that we perceive 
the kinds of existences between which necessary 
connections hold, by labelling them as „mere ideas‟.  
 He seems happy to apply a Separate Imaginability 
Criterion of Distinctness to the billiard balls, where it gives 
him the answer he wants about causation. But in fig. 1 one 
may equally imagine the ovals with two and three stars 
existing on their own. Yet as assembled in fig 1 these 
objects do seem to have necessary connections.  
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 If Hume then argues that the 5 star-oval combos cannot be 
distinct existences precisely because of these necessary 
connections, his maxim effectively becomes: “there are no 
necessary connections between distinct existences, 
which are those existences between which there are no 
necessary connexions”. This seems to rob it of all 
philosophical content.  
iii) “Both” view: One might think of compromising by combining 
the two views as follows: the objects represented by fig 1 are 
ovals and stars and ‘2s‟ and „3s‟.  
 However this raises tricky questions of the relationship between 
physical marks and abstract objects. If they are all separate 
objects, why include the stars and ovals in the diagram at all? 
Why not lose the physical marks, keep the 2s and 3s and draw 
the mathematical moral straight from them? (Obviously 
impossible, thus the view risks incoherence...) 
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 This points the way to our preferred interpretation: 
iv) “Hybrid...but not both”: Rather than understanding 
physical marks and numbers as separate objects, 
attribute to them partial identities.  
 What does this mean? Just that „twoness‟ is a property 
which may be prescinded from this, while precisely not 
being separable from it. This is of course exactly what 
Hume‟s epistemology rules out as impossible.  
 Prescinding without separation is a form of thought 
which a great deal of mathematics rests on. It is 
essential for all structural reasoning. One might argue 
that all necessary reasoning is structural – that 
necessary reasoning in essence consists in recognising 
that a particular structure has the structure that it is 
fact has. (This idea is worked out in (Legg 2012)). 
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7. Conclusion 
 We can perceive necessary truths.  
 In such perception the mind is not passive and atomistic as 
Hume supposes, but active and integrated.  
 If we work out the consequences of this for epistemology, 
where would it take us?  
 Suggest it could be helpful to look back to a rationalist view 
largely left behind by Anglo-American philosophy, which has so 
admired Hume. This view taught that we may attain certain 
knowledge from ideas that are sufficiently clear and distinct.... 
Further work needed.  
 Suggest we reconsider what we mean by „naturalistic 
epistemology‟...  
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7. Conclusion 
 The last few decades have seen an outpouring of work in the 
metaphysics of modality remarkably mismatched by relatively 
slight investigation into the epistemology of modality.  
 We suggest that the strictures imposed by Hume‟s relegation of 
necessary truths to mere „relations between ideas‟, and his horror 
of empirically investigating the mind‟s capacity for abstract thought 
(as an „anti-naturalistic‟, inevitably confused inquiry) have left the 
latter investigation on relatively barren ground.  
 Recent attempts to address the mismatch again largely follow 
Hume in pursuing the idea that conceivability is our guide to 
possibility (Yablo 1993,  Gendler and Hawthorne, 2002).  
 Yet a clear, principled account of what exactly makes certain states 
of affairs „inconceivable‟, and therefore impossible, still seems 
lacking. 
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Final critique of Modal Combinatorialism:  
 Hume‟s notion that nothing is contrary but existence and 
non-existence has had enormous downstream philosophical 
influence.  
 Mill (a law of logic)  Wittgenstein‟s Tractatus  Carnap‟s 
treatment of necessity as truth in all „state-descriptions.  
 From there, the development of possible worlds semantics in 
logic inspired an arguably „un-Humean‟ leap to replacing 
state descriptions conceived of as linguistic entities with 
analogous metaphysical entities (of a variety of kinds) which 
„truth-make‟ modal claims.  
 Yet even in Lewis‟ most extreme form of modal realism 
(Lewis 1986), Modal Combinatorialism played a powerful role 
in his influential („Humean‟) analysis of laws of nature as 
mere patterns of regularity across subsets of possible worlds.  
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Want to suggest this is a syntactic approach to modality.  
Let us attempt to frame the issue in schematic, maximally 
general terms.  
Consider a world consisting of 4 „idea / objects‟ (a, b, c and d)  
conceived of as particulars which may combine to make 
larger states of affairs. Imagine that these idea / objects are 
all distinguishable. Then according to Hume they must be 
separable. Thus, we have: 
 
 
 
A toy universe in which Modal Combinatorialism is true. All combinations are 
possible 
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      ab  ac  ad  ba  bc  bd  ca  cb  cd  da  db  dc… 
Let us now imagine a toy universe in which Modal 
Combinatorialism is false. This  just means that not all 
combinations are realisable. Here is just one example: 
 
 
 This toy universe is missing ac, bc and dc (for some 
reason, let us imagine it is to do with the nature of c).  
 An intelligent mind inspecting the world above might 
summarise the combinations missing from it in a simple 
statement like, „c can never come last in combination‟.  
 This statement is obviously a rudimentary law, or 
universal.  
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             ab  ad  ba  bd  ca  cb  cd  da  db… 
 
 Our point is now merely that the second scenario is not 
incoherent.  
 It is not analytically false to conceive constraints on the happy 
combination of any conceivable object with any other 
conceivable object (bearing in mind that of course these 
objects will have natures).  
 Mathematics, as we have seen, rules out such combinations 
regularly: for example, the combination of 2 × 3 with 3 × x, 
for any x other than 2.  
 Hume‟s Modal Combinatorialism is therefore an 
underhanded way of killing off a kind of realism about 
universals.  
 Hume rules out such constraints by fiat, not by argument  
but necessary mathematical truths should trump plausible 
philosophical overgeneralisations. 
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